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1. INTRODUCTION
The recent United States Supreme Court decisions' terminating the
tumultuous existence of the commercial speech doctrine have stimulated a
host of learned commentaries.2 The vast majority of these articles contend
that all distinctions between commercial speech and other varieties of
speech should be obliterated;3 while on the other hand, a small but resolute
minority continue to maintain that the commercial speech doctrinal
dichotomy is apposite.4 Neither of these positions, however, proffers the
appropriate format by which to handle commercial speech. The
intermediate course pursued by the Supreme Court in recent cases,
establishing commercial speech as entitled to some "lesser degree" of first
amendment protection, offers the proper approach.
This pragmatic solution to the commercial speech problem recognizes
that although such speech is less valuable and less vulnerable than
noncommercial speech, it nevertheless merits some constitutional
protection. The gravest difficulty lies not in the application of this new
doctrine to commercial speech but in its possible wrongful extension to
other "nonfavored" constitutionally protected areas of speech. Already it
appears that several members of the Court have invoked the doctrine as
precedent for attacking "non-obscene erotic speech," 5 thereby thrusting
this new doctrine into the eye of the half-century-old controversy
* Professor, University of North Carolina School of Business Administration.
1. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar ofAriz.,433 U.S. 350
(1977); Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
2. See, e.g., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom,62 IoWA L. REV.
1 (1976); D. Meiklejohn, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 13 CAL. W. L. REv. 430
(1977); Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation ofAdiertlising,90 HARV. L
REv. 661 (1977); Schiro, Commercial Speech: The Demise of a Chimera, 1976 Sup. Cr. REv. 45; The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term,91 HARV. L. REv. 198 (1977); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term,90 HARv. L.
REv. 196(1976); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REv. 116(1975); Note, Yes, FTC. There
is a Virginia: The Impact of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc. on the Federal Trade Commission's Regulation of Misleading Advertising, 57 B.U.L REv. 833
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Yes, FTC]; Note, Conmercial Speech: 7he Supreme Court Sends
Another Valentine to Advertisers, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 737 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Commercial Speech]; Note, Prohibition of Abortion Referral Service Advertising Held Un-
constitutional, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 640 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Prohibition of Abortion];
Note, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Expression, 3 HASTINGS CoNsSr. L. Q. 761 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Constitutional Status].
3. See, e.g., D. Meiklejohn, supra note 2; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L REv. 142
(1976); Note, Prohibition of Abortion, supra note 2; Note, Constitutional Status, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 2.
5. See Young v. American MiniTheatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61, 69-70 (1976), discussed at notes
181-95 infra. The complex intertwining within the case of several other significant issues resulted in an
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surrounding the meaning of the words "Congress shall make no
law . . .abridging the freedom of speech."6 This article initially will
review the old commercial speech doctrine and then proceed to analyze,
explain, and justify the new commercial speech doctrine. Once this is
accomplished, the article will demonstrate why this new "lesser degree of
protection" principle should not be extended to other areas of speech and,
finally, outline some additional parameters and guidelines for the new
doctrine.
II. THE ENIGMATIC COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE:
7
A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The exact nature and extent of the commercial speech doctrine is
unclear due to its "casual, almost offhand" 8 inception in Valentine v.
Chrestensen.9 The Supreme Court, confronted with a case that concerned
the constitutional right to distribute commercial handbills in violation of
New York's antilitter ordinance,'0 stated-without citation or analysis-
the following rule:
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for
the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating
opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately
regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or
proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear
that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising."
Whether the Court fully intended to establish a new category of
opinion that does not precisely define what the plurality actually intended, but it is highly likely that
they meant to extend the reasoning of the commercial speech doctrine to this other area of speech. d.
The term "non-obscene erotic speech" is defined as sexually explicit expression that is not classified as
obscene, i.e., it is constitutionally protected speech. See notes 54, 55, 64 and accompanying text Infra.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally note 64 infra.
7. For a comprehensive analysis of this area, see Schiro, supra note 2.
8. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart,
Marshall, and Powell, JJ., dissenting); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 393 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 398 (Douglas, J., dissenting) Id. at
401 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
9. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
10. The New York ordinance provided:
Handbills, cards and circulars.-No person shall throw, cast or distribute, or cause or
permit to be thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill, circular, card, booklet, placard or
other advertising matter whatsoever in or upon any street or public place, or in a front yard or
court yard, or on any stoop, or in the vestibule or any hall of any building, or in a letterbox
therein; provided that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prohibit or otherwise
regulate the delivery of any such matter by the United States postal service, or prohibit the
distribution of sample copies of newspapers regularly sold by the copy or by annual
subscription. This section is not intended to prevent the lawful distribution of anything other
than commercial and business advertising matter.
Id. at 53 n.l.
11. Id. at 54.
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unprotected speech 12 or whether it was imprecisely and hastily balancing
the countervailing interests is debatable.' 3 Nevertheless, it is generally
regarded that the former position is correct 4 and that the Court relied
upon the primary purpose or motive of the speech to arrive at its
commercial nature.1
5
Over the next two decades the doctrine lay relatively dormant. The
few relevant cases that were decided by the Court substantiated the
primary purpose test as the appropriate standard and suggested a possible
religious/ secular dichotomy.16  Solicitations on behalf of religious
organizations were not considered commercial ventures and were
protected by the first amendment,17 while door-to-door solicitations for
secular endeavors remained unprotectedl'-a distinction arguably
inconsistent with the establishment clauset9 of the United States
Constitution.
The next significant opportunity for the Supreme Court to review the
commercial speech doctrine was New York Tnies Co. v. Sullivan.2" Before
12. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), discussed at notes 54.55,64 and
accompanying text infra.
13. Immediately following the above quoted portion of the opinion, the Court stated that the
question was whether the legislative body must permit the pursuit of lawful business"by what it deems
an undesirable invasion of, or interference with, the full and free use of the highways by the people in
fulfillment of the public use to which streets are dedicated." 316 U.S. at 54-55. This suggests that if a
balancing test were, in fact, employed, the scales would undoubtedly be tipped in favor of
governmental regulation. The Court would grant little, if any, protection to commercial advertising
and there would, therefore, be no need to carry out an elaborate balancing under the circumstances.
See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). For the purposes ofthisarticle, thecategorization of
commercial speech as fully unprotected will be accepted as the true holding of the opinion. Se note 14
and accompanying text infra.
14. Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 934(1972); Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969).
15. Plaintiff-respondent, when informed by the New York Police Commissioner that he could
not distribute his commercial handbill upon the streets of New York but that noncommercial or
business literature was permissible, printed on the back of his commercial handbill a message of public
concern. The Court, however, determined that Chrestensen's attachment of his statement of public
concern was a mere attempt to circumvent the law and would not be permitted. The primary purpose of
Chrestensen's handbill was deemed commercial and not related to the public interest. 316 U.S. at 55.
16. See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (upholding a city ordin',=
prohibiting door-to-door solicitation as applied to a seller of secular magazine subscriptions); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (striking down a local ordinance that prohibited door-to-door
distribution of advertisements as applied to a Jehovah's Witness who circulated information about
future meetings); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down an ordinance that
required religious peddlers to pay a licensing fee prior to undertaking their activity):Jamison %. Texas,
318 U.S. 413 (1943) (protecting a distributor of religious handbills that invited the purchase ofreligious
books from a local ordinance prohibiting the distribution of handbills).
17. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
18. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (the homeowner's interest in privacy
outweighed any first amendment consideration).
19. U.S. Co,sT. amend. I. This argument was put forth in Note, Yes, FTC, supra note 2.
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). A civil libel action was brought against the New York 7linesand several
other defendants for the New York ihnes publication of a paid advertisement, seeking monetary
support for the NAACP, that contained erroneous statements concerning police conduct.
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reaching the fundamental libel question, the Court had to resolve whether
* the first amendment freedoms of speech and press were applicable
"because the allegedly libelous statements were published as part of a paid,
'commercial' advertisement.",21 In deciding this preliminary question in
favor of the newspaper, the Court carefully distinguished Chrestensen on
the basis that the handbill distributed therein was a purely commercial
advertisement while
[t]he publication here [in the New York Times] was not a "commercial"
advertisement in the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen. It
communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested
claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
concern.
22
Thus, the Court abandoned its primary purpose or motive test in favor of a
content analysis. Since the questioned advertisement contained important
public interest information, it was entitled to constitutional protection
despite the fact that it was a paid advertisement soliciting monetary
support.23 The Court, in an excellent and revealing discussion of the first
amendment's freedom of expression provision, noted that false remarks
were inevitable in free, open, and robust political debate and that these
must be accepted so as not to chill comment.S The constitutional
guarantee of free speech "presupposes that right conclusions are more
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind
of authoritative selection. 25 Such a fundamental constitutional principle
cannot be permitted to turn upon its "truthfulness. '26 Therefore, the
Court, employing a system of definitional balancing,27 concluded that a
21. Id. at 265.
22. Id. at 266.
23. This holding enabled the Court to reach the ultimate question of newspaper libel of public
officials and to alter the applicable standard of liability to instances when the public official can prove
actual malice-i.e., the making of a statement with knowledge of its falsity or with a reckless
indifference to its truth.
24. 376 U.S. at 271. See generally notes 165-70 and accompanying text infra. "Under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea." Gertz v. RobertWelch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,339 (1974);
but see Part III infra concerning commercial speech and deceptive advertising.
25. 376 U.S. at 270 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943) (per L. Hand, J.)).
26. Id.
27. Melvin Nimmer has been one of the foremost advocates of this approach (modern day
absolutism, also referred to as "categorization") which he defines as the
balancing process on the definitional rather than the litigation or ad hoc level. That is, the
Court employs balancing not for the purpose of determining which litigant deserves to prevail
in the particular case, but only for the purpose of defining which forms of speech are to be
regarded as "speech" within the meaning of the first amendment.
Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and
Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935, 942 (1968) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as
Nimmer, The Right to Speak]. See also T. EMERSON, TOWARD A OLNERAL TIhEoRY oF rHE FIRsT
AMENDMENT (1966); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960). Nimmer, National
Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN, L. REv. 311
(1974); Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 U.CL.A. L. REv,
29 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Nimmer, Symbolic Speech].
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public official must demonstrate actual malice28 upon the part of the
defendant in order to prevail in a libel suit arising out of his official
conduct.
A second important commercial speech decision concerning a
newspaper was Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations.29 In Pittsburgh Press the Court was confronted with the issue
whether a newspaper could constitutionally be prohibited from publishing
any reference to sex in its employment advertising column headings.30 The
newspaper argued that such a restriction violated the freedoms of press
and speech by interfering with its editorial discretion.31 The Commission,
distinguishing New York Times, successfully countered that under
Chrestensen this purely commercial expression was unprotected speech.32
The Court33 held further that even assuming, arguendo, that the
commercial speech doctrine should be abrogated it would not be decisive
in this situation since "[d]iscrimination in employment is not only
commercial activity, it is illegal commercial activity .... 34
The significance of this decision 5 is attenuated by the fact that the
Court was not merely balancing the governfnental interest in regulating
expression against the freedom of speech, but was also confronted by the
important values of freedom of the press and equal employment op-
portunities. 36 The majority was swayed by the argument that the sex-
designated columns aided employers -in their discriminatory hiring
practices,37 while the dissenters, with the exception of Justice Douglas,
seemed more impressed by the freedom of the press issue.38 Thus, analysts
28. See note 23 supra.
29. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
30. Id. at 380-81.
31. Id. at 384-86.
32. The Court recognized that under the New York limes rationale, "speech is not rendered
commercial by the mere fact that it relates to an advertisement,"413 U.S. at 384, but further stated that
the publications in question, classified job advertisements, were "classic examples of commercial
speech." Id. at 385. They proposed nothing beyond the invitation to apply for employment.
33. Mr. Justice Powell authored the opinion and was joined by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Rehnquist. The Chief Justice filed a dissenting opinion, as did Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and Blackmun.
34. 413 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in original). The Court believed that the division of job
advertisements into "Jobs-Male Interest," "Jobs-Female Interest," and "Male-Female" assisted
employers in carrying out illegal discriminatory hiring practices and was therefore not protected by the
first amendment. See also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Pennsylvania Human
Relations Comm'n, 31 Pa. Commonw. Ct. 218, 376 A.2d 263 (1977) (an interesting turn of events).
35. It should be kept in mind that this article focuses upon Pittsburgh Press for purposes of the
commercial speech doctrine.
36. Donald Meiklejohn, in reference to this decision, observed that "[tlhe close decision in
Pittsburgh Press rested upon a complex balance of the constitutional status ofcommercial speech, the
urgency of the job equality cause, the dangers of governmental interference, and the values of
unfettered publishing." D. Meiklejohn, supra note 2, at 435-36.
37. See note 34 supra.
38. The Chief Justice felt that this decision was a "disturbing enlargement of the'commercial
speech' doctrine . . . and a serious encroachment on the freedom of the press" in that it reached
"the layout and organizational decisions of a newspaper." 413 U.S. at 393 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
Mr. Justice Stewart, who was joined in this section of his opinion by Justices Douglas and
Blackmun, disagreed with the Court's decision because "[i]t approves a government order dictating to
19791
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of the Court's position on freedom of speech must discount the impact of
this particular decision.39
The final case that should be considered is Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights,40 an extremely interesting decision that runs contrary to the
fundamental principles of the first amendment by favoring commercial
speech over political speech. A plurality4' of the Court, with Mr. Justice
Douglas concurring in the result, permitted the city's transit system to
exclude all political advertisements from its carriers, although it accepted
commercial advertisements. The plurality reasoned that because there was
no public forum the question of freedom of expression need not be
reached:
In much the same way that a newspaper or periodical, or even a radio or
television station, need not accept every proffer of advertising from the
general public, a city transit system has discretion to develop and make
reasonable choices concerning the type of advertising that may be displayed
in its vehicles.4
2
This decision, the plurality felt, was reasonable because the transit system
was protecting a captive audience43 from irritating advertisements,
shielding itself from the charge of political favoritism, and employing an
equitable standard in forbidding all political advertisements.
4
Lehman, however, is highly questionable; once a public transit system
freely opens its doors to commercial advertisements it should not
constitutionally be permitted to reject the more important political
messages. 45 To permit this type of "reverse discrimination" cuts at the very
heart of fundamental first amendment guarantees.4 6 Furthermore, the
Court's contention that this type of regulation is permissible because it is
designed to protect a captive audience is untenable. As appropriately
a publisher in advance how he must arrange the layout of pages in his newspaper." Id. at401 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Moreover, this dissent expressed doubt concerning the validity of the Chrestensen
decision, presaging events to come. See Part III infra.
Mr. Justice Douglas, who joined in Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent, also took the opportunity to
advocate an absolutist interpretation of the first amendment. Mr. Justic Douglas argued that there
can be no law curtailing the freedoms of the press and expression, except "when speech and action are
so closely brigaded that they are really one." 413 U.S. at 398 (Dougla;, J., dissenting),
39. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,759
(1976), the Supreme Court stated that the holding in Pittsburgh Press was premised upon the illegality
issue and not the commercial speech aspect.
40. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
41. Mr. Justice Blackmun wrote the short and unilluminating opinion, He was joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices White and Rehnquist.
42. 418 U.S. at 303.
43. The Court held that viewers of billboards and streetcar signs had no choice but to perceive
the advertisement. See also Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
44. 418 U.S. at 302-04. Mr. Justice Douglas reached his conclusion on similar grounds, Id. at
306-08 (concurring opinion).
45. Id. at 310-I1 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell).
46. Id.
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pointed out by Mr. Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion, the rider is
not compelled to read the advertisement and surely any minor
inconvenience caused the passenger "is a small price to pay for the
continual preservation of such precious a liberty as free speech."
47
Moreover, it is inconceivable that the Court could find a rational
distinction between the respective inconvenience caused by political and
commercial advertisements. Nevertheless, the dissent in Lehman served
clearly to augur the demise of the Chrestensen commercial speech
doctrine48 and the possible creation of a new, less potent, replacement
doctrine. It was the dissenters' belief that commercial speech did come
within the guarantees of the first amendment, although it might "be
accorded less . ..protection than speech concerning political and social
issues of public importance. 49
III. THE Lehman DISSENTERS' PROPHECY COMES TO FRUITION:
THE DEMISE OF THE UNPROTECTED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
DOCTRINE AND THE RISE OF A LESS PROTECTED COMMERCIAL
SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. Bigelow v. Virginia: The Initiation of a Substantive Attack
on the Old Doctrine and the Inception of a New
Ad Hoc Balancing Doctrine
In Bigelow v. Virginia5" the Supreme Courts' recognized that
commercial speech is not "stripped of all First Amendment protection.
The relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services
does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas."52 The Court,
however, was not prepared to confront the Chrestensen doctrine head on,
and in circumventing the issue "inadvertently" created two intriguing
quandaries.
Jeffrey Bigelow, the editor of a Virginia newspaper, was criminally
prosecuted for printing an advertisement for a New York abortion referral
service, in violation of a Virginia statute that prohibited advertisements
encouraging abortions. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Bigelow's
47. Id. at 321.
48. Id. at 314 n.6. See also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376,393 (1973) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (majority opinion termed a"disturbingenlargement" of
the commercial speech doctrine); id. at 398 (Douglas, J., dissenting); fd. at 401 n.6 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
49. 418 U.S. at 314 (emphasis in original).
50. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
51. The Bigelow opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Blackmun andjoined by the ChiefJusticc
and Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell. Mr. Justice Rehnquist filed a
dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice White joined.
52. 421 U.S. at 826 (emphasis added). Here, the Court measured importance of commercial
speech in relation to the standard set by Mr. Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States,250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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conviction on the basis that it was commercial speech and therefore not
protected by the first amendment and because the advertisement affected
health, which the state has a legitimate and compelling interest in
regulating.
After disposing of the threshold overbreadth issue, the United States
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Blackmun, ruled in favor of
Bigelow upon a two-tiered analysis.53 First, the Court sought to dispel the
notion that merely because speech contained a commercial element it lost
all first amendment protection. Commercial speech, it reasoned, does not
fit into one of the categories of unprotected speech identified in Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire54 or its progeny.55 Nor did Chrestensen establish it as an
additional category of nonspeech since "the holding [was] a distinctly
limited one: the ordinance was upheld as a reasonable regulation of the
manner in which commercial advertising could be distributed. 56 This was
a novel redefinition and reinterpretation after thirty years of contradictory
holdings.57
The Court, however, did not subscribe to its own rhetoric but felt
compelled to align the case with New York Times. The Bigelow
advertisement was found to be worthy of some constitutional protection
because its content provided factual information pertaining to an
important issue of public concern.58 In light of the Bigelow reinterpreta-
53. The Court, interestingly, after first indicating its receptivene.s to the threshold overbreadth
challenge, declined to dispose of the case on that ground because of a recent revision in the pertinent
statute and its desire to pursue the commercial speech issue. See also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350 (1977) and notes 139-42 and accompanying text infra; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 462 n.20 (1978). The overbreadth doctrine provides that a state regulation suppressing first
amendment freedoms will be invalidated, regardless whether it has been properly applied in the case
before the court, if the restriction infringes upon a protected freedom. The doctrine serves to prevent a
state regulation from improperly chilling first amendment rights. See G ooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See generally Torke, The Future ofFirst Amendment
Overbreadth, 27 VAND. L. REV. 289 (1974); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 201 n,24
(1977); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
54. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). See note 64 infra.
55. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S.
901, 903 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (fighting words); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(incitement); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity).
56. 421 U.S. at 819. The Court proceeded to cite New York Times and Pittsburgh Press in
support of its contention that "any sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per se" is
unsupportable. Id. at 820. But see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 758 (1976), which acknowledged that Chrestensen did in fact give "some
indication that commercial speech is unprotected"; see also Linmark Am.socs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S.
85 (1977).
Additionally, it should be noted that the Court's reading of Pittsburgh Press, that the
advertisement would have received some first amendment protection but for its illegality, is misguided,
See notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra. The Court is misinterpreting an alternative conditional
ruling as the holding of the case.
57. But see note 13 and accompanying text supra.
58. The Court, in analogizing the advertisement in Bigelow to that in New York rmes, stated
that the advertisement was more than a mere proposal to engage in a commercial transaction. It
presented "factual material of clear'public interest' "such as (1) that abortions are legal in New York,
(2) that there is no residency requirement to have an abortion in New York, and (3) that services are
offered by groups such as the Women's Pavilion (the advertiser). 421 U.S. at 822. The complete text of
the advertisement appears at id. at 812.
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tion of Chrestensen, however, there is no need to comport the Bigelow
advertisement with New York Times or to continually remind the reader
that commercial speech is not wholly outside the protection of the first
amendment.59 If Chrestensen merely dealt with a reasonable regulation
regarding the manner in which information could be disseminated, then
there would be no precedent creating a dichotomy between commercial
and pure speech. It is well established that all speech can be reasonably
restricted with respect to time, place, or manner of expression.W Thus, the
Court, in an ultimate irony, renders a "Catch-22" decision in which it
interprets away a principal doctrine but continues to apply the doctrines
exceptions-an incredibly deft feat.
Another interesting question created by the Court's eireumvolutions
59. "[S]peech is not stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it appears in
[commercial] form," id. at 818; its commercial aspect does "not negate all First Amendment
guarantees," id.; there is no "sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per se," Id. at 820;
.commercial advertising enjoys a degree of First Amendment protection," id. at 821; "[w]e conclude,
therefore, that the Virginia courts erred in their assumptions that advertising, as such, was entitled to
no First Amendment protection," id. at 825.
60. It has been well established that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon
protected speech are permissible provided that they further an important state interest and are precisely
tailored to accomplish their purpose. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1972); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,46.48 (1966); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-87 (1949); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941). See generally G. GUNTHER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTs IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 740-858 (1976); Ely, Flag Desecratlon:A Case Study in
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendnent Analysis, 88 HAMv. L. REv. 1482
(1975); Kalven, The Concept oftthe Public Forun: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 1; Wright,
The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90
HARV. L. REv., 171,186 (1976); Note, Equal Protection andthe First Amendnzent:ZoningAwa), Skid
Row, 31 U. MIAMI L. REy. 713 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Equal Protection]. See also note 64
infra.
In United Statesv. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court defined anelaborate testforspeech that
contains elements of both speech and nonspeech. Although it could be argued that the O'Brien test is
limited to symbolic speech and does not extend to all conduct cases, that is, cases containing time,
place, or manner restrictions, this argument has been successfully refuted. See Buckley v. Valco, 424
U.S. 1, 17, 65 n.76 (1976); Ely, supra, at 1484 n.l 1; Nimmer, Symbolic Speedh, supra note 27. The
O'Brien standard is as follows:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
391 U.S. at 377.
A second intriguing and extremely subtle aspect of O'Brien is that the Court, in formulating its
standard, relied not only upon decisions regulating conduct (time, place, or manner regulation) but
also upon decisions regulating the content of speech. Hence, a plausible argument can be constructed
that, despite the criticism O'Brien received from some absolutists, see, e.g., Alfange, Free Speech and
Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 1, it might, in fact, represent the
high water mark for such theorists. Certainly, one might infer that the Court, by unifying the two types
of cases under the standard presented, was announcing that government regulation over speech could
only occur if thegovernment interest was not related to the suppression ofspech. This, ofourse, is the
equivalent of saying that all content regulation is constitutionally impermissible-the exact position
espoused by the modem day absolutists and by a majority of the Warren Court. Seegenerally Brennan,
The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1965). For an interesting reinterpretation of this argument favoring the balancers, see note 69 infra.
61. Mr. Justice Rehnquist referred to the Court's refusal to meet the issue head onas merely a
"series of verbal sideswipes." 421 U.S. at 830 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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arises out of the second tier of its analysis, that is, its balancing test. After
concluding that the Bigelow advertisement merited constitutional
protection, the Court recognized that u:ider certain circumstances even
first amendment expression could be regulated.62 The Court determined
the propriety of such regulation of commercial speech through a balancing
analysis that compared the various interests in the free exercise of the
expression with the state's justifications supporting the suppression.63
Superficially, this appears to be a reacceptance of the principle of ad hoc
balancing64 to determine first amendment protection. However, the
Court's linguistic standard is far removed from traditional first
amendment analysis: 65 "Advertising, like all public expression, may be
subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest. 66
This standard is much more suggestive of the rationally related purpose
62. Id. at 826.
63. Id. at 826-29.
64. As already indicated, see note 60 supra, it is well recognized that certain restrictions of time,
place, or manner of expression are permissible. Beyond this, however, there is considerable divergence
between two fundamental and alien positions-that of the "absolutist ," and that of the "balancers,"
The term "absolutists" is a misnomer and has generally given way to "categorizers" or "definitional
balancers" since this camp does not contend that no law shall abridge free speech. Rather, it is their
position that certain categories of speech are not protected by the first amendment. See note 27 supra
and authorities cited therein. These categories are to be determined under exacting scrutiny, see notes
55, 56 and accompanying text supra, and beyond these few limited areas, speech, except for reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions, shall not be abridged by the government. Whatever balancing
must occur to determine what speech is protected speech has already been accomplished by the drafters
of the Bill of Rights. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting), See
Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 60, at 647-50; M. SIIAI'IRO,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REvIEW (1966); Frantz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
The balancers believe that a government regulation directly suppressing speech can be approved if
under exacting scrutiny it substantially furthers a compelling state interest and it is the least intrusive
alternative method to further the state interest. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360-63 (1976); Id. tt
381,387, 389 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Buckley v. Valco, 424
U.S. 1, 25, 64-65 (1976); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961); NAACP V.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382 (1950). See generally Ely, supra note 60; Gunther, fi Search of Judicial Quality on a
Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001 (1972); Linde, Clear and Present
Danger Reexamineed: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1970);
Mendelson, The First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply tc Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV.
479 (1964); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Limitations on Contributions to Political Coimittees In
the 1976 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, 78 YALE L.J. 953 (1977); Note, Less Drastic
Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, Less Drastic
Means].
In the earliest freedom of speech cases, the Supreme Court used an ad hoc balancing approach, see
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), and
continued to do so until the Warren Court years witnessed the emergence of the categorization
approach, see cases cited supra. However, recent cases emanating from the Supreme Court appear to
indicate that once again the balancers have the upper hand. It is in the midst of these developments that
the commercial speech cases reached the Court.
65. The word "traditional" is used here to describe the balancing approach, see note 64 supra,
although under both the absolutist and balancing approaches the Court has employed terms like
"compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong;" United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
66. 421 U.S. at 826.
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test of equal protection67 than of those doctrines that have traditionally
been employed in the regulation of free expression. 6  Moreover, the
diverse array of cases cited in support of this proposition only enhances the
confusion.69
Under close scrutiny, it is evident that the Court had a dual purpose:
first, to reestablish the principle of ad hoc balancing of protected speech;
and second, to provide commercial speech with less constitutional
protection than pure speech. The problem is that the Court so intertwined
the two as to blunt the impact of the holdings. To some extent, this
confusion may have been intentional; it plays upon the near unanimity of
distaste for the commercial speech doctrine and avoids any unnecessary
general confrontation over the first amendment.0 In any event, an analysis
of the decision reveals the following: first, that at least for commercial
speech, the Court invoked an ad hoc balancing standard to determine
when protected speech might be suppressed; second, that the Court,
although employing minimum scrutiny language, clearly did not utilize
such a standard;71 third, that the Court did not follow the traditional
67. The courts have traditionally applied a two-tiered test to equal protection cases-an
exacting scrutiny standard to cases concerning suspect classifications or fundamental rights and a
minimal scrutiny standard to all other cases. Under the latter test, a governmental regulation will be
upheld if it is reasonably related to its stated purpose. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Ternm-
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Afodel for a Newrer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972); Note, A Question of Balance: Statutory Classification Under
the Equal Protection Clause, 26 STAN. L. REv. 155 (1973); Note, Equal Protection, supra note60. For
all practical purposes, a regulation scrutinized under a rationally related purpose standard is always
upheld, while precisely the opposite fateawaits those regulations examined under the exacting scrutiny
test. See authorities cited in this note and Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L
REV. 1065 (1969).
68. See note 64 supra.
69. The cases cited by Mr. Justice Blackmun in support of his reasonable regulation to serve a
legitimate public interest test were Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376 (1973) (a case of dubious relevance; see notes 29.40 and accompanying text supra) and
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (a questionable decision holding that first
amendment rights only exist in public forums; see notes 40-50 and accompanying text supra). The
Court also cited the following casis in a footnote: Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (holding that
the first amendment does not provide free access to jailhouse property for the purpose of making a
public protest); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (upholding a statute that prohibited
demonstrations within close proximity to a court building as a reasonable regulation of conduct, i.e.,
a time, place, or manner restriction); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (upholding a
nondiscretionary ordinance which mandated that a license be obtained in order to hold an open air
public meeting); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (striking down an ordinance requiring that a
permit be obtained prior to holding a public worship meeting because it granted the city official too
much discretion); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (a holding similar to Paulos).Thus, the
cases merely stand for the proposition that reasonable regulations can be placed upon conduct. 421
U.S. at 826 n.l I. It is inevitable that at times an individual's interest in expression willcome inconflict
with the public's interest in use of its parks and streets and the state must be permitted to make
reasonable regulations to reconcile the two. See Neimotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,273-89 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also note 60 supra. In Bigelow, the balancing wing ofthe Court may
have been attempting to utilize the subtle argument of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
which harmonized the speech regulation cases in an attempt to end all content regulation. See note 60
supra.
70. See generally note 64 supra.
71. As indicated supra note 67, when the minimum scrutiny test is employed the government
regulation is almost invariably upheld. Similar challenges under the minimum scrutiny test ofthe equal
protection clause have resulted, as anticipated, in decisions favorable to the government, and some of
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exacting scrutiny standard for the ad hoc suppression of protected speech
based upon its content;72 and last, that the Court did employ a modified
balancing version of the time, place, or manner standard, even though the
controversy concerned the direct suppression of speech.
The Bigelow Court's standard could, therefore, be summarized as
follows: a government regulation directly suppressing commercial speech
is valid if (1) upon a balancing of the various interests, the state's
justification prevails under close scrutiny, (2) the regulation substantially
furthers a legitimate, albeit not compelling, state purpose, and (3) the
regulation, narrowly tailored to accomplish its designed purpose,
constitutes the least restrictive alternative.7 3 Using this standard, the Court
had little difficulty in granting the factually significant Bigelow advertise-
ment constitutional protection in light of the "little, if any weight" 74
accorded to the government justifications for its suppression.'
B. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy:
The New "Lesser Protected" Commercial Speech Doctrine
Becomes Firmly Entrenched, the Old Commercial
Speech Doctrine Fades Away
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council,76 the Supreme Court expanded and refined its Bigelow test. In
Virginia Pharmacy Board, the Court was confronted with the question
that it had decided it need not resolve in Bigelow: whether an
advertisement that merely proposes a commercial transaction is "wholly
outside the protection of the First Amendment. 77 The case arose out of a
these decisions are favorably cited in footnote 10 of the Court's opinion. 421 U.S. at 825 n.10,
Furthermore, although the language used by the Court suggests a minimum scrutiny test, the analysis
and the cases cited do not. See 421 U.S. at 826-29; note 69 supra. See also Virginia State Bd, of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748(1976); note 90 and accompanying text
infra. Mr. Justice Rehnquist recognized this weakness in the Court's opinion and argued that surely
"the statute in question is a'reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest.' "421 U.S. at
836 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72. The Court's language, citations, and analysis clearly do not comport with an exacting
scrutiny standard. It is impossible to ignore the Court's use of "reasonable regulation" language or its
citations to numerous time, place, or manner cases dealing with reasonable restrictions upon
expression.
73. If one prefers, the three prongs can be collapsed into two by cmbining elements (1) and (2),
That is, the regulation will be upheld when it substantially furthers an important state interest
outweighing the interests of those it is regulating. It should also be noted that the phrase "close
inspection," although not employed in Bigelow, seems to suggest the analysis actually used (as opposed
to exacting scrutiny) and hence was taken by this author from Virginia Pharmacy Board. 425 U.S. at
769. For further discussion of this test and its justifications, see Part IV. A. infra.
74. 421 U.S. at 828.
75. The Court was wholly unimpressed by the argument that Virginia was preserving the quality
of medical care by preventing fee splitting arrangements and other referral service abuses,
76. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). This was a seven to one decision in which Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Id. at 781.
77. Id. at 761. The Court was initially confronted by the question whether the plaintiffs had
standing to bring the action. They were not directly subject to the prohibition, but contended that they
had a right to "receive information that pharmacists wish to communicate to them through advertising
or other professional means, concerning the prices of . . .drugs." Id. at 754. This concept had
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challenge by prescription drug consumers to have a Virginia statute, which
in essence prohibited pharmacists from advertising prescription drug
prices, invalidated as being violative of the first and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution. In resolving this question
the Court fully laid to rest whatever "fragment of hope" Bigelow left78 for
the Chrestensen doctrine;79 namely, that commercial speech is an
unprotected form of expression. At the same time the Court reinforced the
concept of a new commercial speech doctrine:
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment
protection, we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other
forms. There are commonsense differences between speech that does "no
more than propose a commercial transaction," . . . and other varieties.
Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is
valueless, and thus subject to complete suppression by the State, they
nonetheless suggest that a different degree ofprolection is necessary to insure
that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is
unimpaired. 0
In Virginia Pharmacy Board the Court again applied a two-tiered test,
but one with several marked differences from the Bigelow test.8 ' The first
level of analysis consisted of an ad hoc balancing that included all three
prongs of the Bigelow standard8 2 The Court acknowledged that since
commercial speech does not fall within a category of unprotected speech,
any attempt to regulate it must be based upon its content.8 3
Mr. Justice Blackmun then proceeded to weigh the various interests in
support of the speech against the state's interest in its regulation. Focusing
on the interests favoring free speech, the Court looked to: first, the
advertiser's interest-which, despite its economic nature, is entitled to first
amendment protection; 4 second, the consumer's interest-which"may be
received significant support from the academic community, see T. El-itso.;, supra note 27; A.
MEIKLFJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 39 (1948); Redish, 7he First
Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO.
WAsH. L. REV. 429, 435-36 (1971), and received the support of the Court here. "If there is a right to
advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising." 425 U.S. at 757. Seealso Procunierv.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,409 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753(1972); Lamontv. Postmaster
Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
78. 425 U.S. at 760. See also Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977). See
generally The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 143 (1976).
79. The Court noted that "last Term in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). the notion of
unprotected 'commercial speech' all but passed from the scene." 425 U.S. at 759.
80. 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
81. The first level of the Bigelow test included a refutation of the Chrestensen doctrine and the
announcement that the advertisement would be accorded protection under a New York Tmes
rationale. The second level was an ad hoc balancing of interests. In Virginia Pharmacy Board the first
level (Bigelow havingdisposed of the nonspeech concept forcommercial advertisements) was an ad hoc
balancing, while the second tier was a general analysis of whether this particular form of protected
speech could be regulated.
82. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
83. 425 U.S. at 761.
84. The Court relied upon the freedom of expression enjoyed by parties to a labor dispute despite
their economic interest. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissell Packaging Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Thornhill ".
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent
political debate ' 85 that is the cornerstone of first amendment protection;
86
and last, the public's interest-which is also compelling because the
advertisement may contain information of general public interest and,
even if it does not, "is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in
a free enterprise system. 87 Pure commercial advertising therefore satisfies
the content test of Bigelow and New York Times in that it provides
assistance to the public in rendering enlightened decisions on matters of
general concern. The Court thus reaffirmed the relationship of speech in
"the marketplace of products or of services" to the capstone of free
expression-"the marketplace of ideas,"'8-definitively rejecting the
notion that commercial speech is unprotected speech.89
"Arrayed against these substantial individual and social interests"90
were a number of inconsequential and uncompelling state justifications.9
The Court was not persuaded by the assertion that the ban on
advertisement of prescription drug prices was necessary to maintain the
quality and professionalism of pharmaceutical care, primarily because it
was founded upon the "highly paternalistic" approach of keeping the
public in ignorance. 92 "[I]nformation is not itself harmful . . . . [P]eople
will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed,
and . . . the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them."93 Thus, the Court employed an
ad hoc balancing test in evaluating the competing interests. It cast a keen
eye toward whether the regulation substantially furthered an important
85. 425 U.S. at 763.
86. See Brennan, supra note 60, at 1; Part IV. A. infra. See also Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
87. 425 U.S. at 765. The Court also reasoned that even if one accepted Dr. Alexander
Meiklejohn's theory as expressed in FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GoVERNMENT, supra note
77-that the first amendment pertains to public enlightenment in the administration of democratic
decision-making-commercial information would still be somewhat protected. Pure commercial
messages provide the citizenry with important information concerning how the system is functioning
and how it should beregulated oraltered. Compare Alexander Meiklejohn's theory with that espoused
by Donald Meiklejohn, supra note 2, and Redish, supra note77. See Part IV. A. infra. This is true only
to the extent that the information provided is accurate and truthful. See note 130 infra.
88. 425 U.S. at 760 (quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825-26 (1975)).
89. See id. at 762.
90. Id. at 766.
91. The pharmacy board argued that the removal of the presetiption drug price prohibition
would (I) force pharmacists to stop providing certain services to their customers, (2) induce consumers
to price shop and thus end the traditional and important pharmaeist-c ustomer relationship, and (3)
cause the pharmacist to lose his professional self-image. Id. at 766-70.
92. Id. at 770. The Court pointed out that 95% of all prescription drugs are prepackaged by the
manufacturer and merely sold by the pharmacist. Moreover, studies have indicated that the price
differentials of certain drugs have ranged up to 1200% within one city. Most significantly, the Court
added that since the profession is already extensively regulated, it could successfully and less intrusively
continue to maintain quality health care without the advertising ban.
93. Id. This is clearly a "marketplace of ideas" rationale.
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state interest and was the least intrusive alternative94 -and found the
Virginia regulation lacking on both counts.
The first level of the Virginia Pharmacy Board Court's analysis
appears to establish, first, that all commercial speech is entitled to some
first amendment protection,95 and second, that the relevant Virginia
statute was constitutionally infirm as determined by an ad hoc balancing.
It is not self-evident what standard of examination the Court used in
conducting the balance-a Bigelow standard, an exacting scrutiny
standard,96 or a rational reason standard.
The Court did not state which standard it actually relied upon,
although it did expressly reject any possibility that the Bigelow
"reasonably related" language was intended to create a minimum scrutiny
standard. The most significant analysis, however, is provided by the
Court in the second tier of its examination. This level of analysis dealt with
the traditionally accepted principle that all forms of protected speech can,
under appropriate circumstances, be regulated. To his discussion of one of
these permissible forms of commercial speech restriction, 98-namely, the
prohibition of false, deceptive, and misleading advertisements-Justice
Blackmun appended his all-important footnote twenty-four. This footnote
reads as follows:
In concluding that commerical speech enjoys First Amendment
protection, we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other
forms. There are commonsense differences between speech that does "no
more than propose a commercial transaction," . . . and other varieties.
Even if the differences do notjustify the conclusion that commercial speech is
valueless, and thus subject to complete suppression by the State, they
nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure
that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is
unimpaired. The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be more
easily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political
commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate
information about a specific product or service that he himself provides and
presumably knows more about than anyone else. Also, commercial speech
may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non
94. Concerning the least intrusive alternative, see generally Note, Less Drastic Means, supra
note 64.
95. It is interesting that in order to arrive at this result the Court was forced to employ an analysis
that could be labeled "reverse definitional balancing."
96. For support of the view that exacting scrutiny was employed, see Schirosupra note 2, at96;
Note, Connercial Speech Blockbusting, and the First Amendment: Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Willingboro, 7 CAP. L. Rav.271,281-83 (1977); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term,90 HARv. L. REV. 145-
48 (1976).
97. The Court stated that it would not invoke the equal protection standard of rational reason
employed in Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S.424 (1963), Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), and Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935), because
the first amendment demands closer scrutiny. 425 U.S. at 769.
98. The Court noted four such permissible forms of commercial speech regulation: reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions; prohibition of false, deceptive, and misleading advertisements;
prohibition of advertisements proposing illegal transactions; and reasonable restrictions upon the use
of the electronic media. Id. at 771-73.
1979]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper
regulation and foregone entirely.
Attributes such as these, the greater objectivity and hardiness of
commercial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate
statements for fear of silencing the speaker. . . . They may also mike it
appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or
include such additional information, warnings, and displaimers, as are
necessary to prevent its being deceptive . . . They also make inapplicable
the prohibition against prior restraints. .. .
. The major question concerning this footnote is whether its
tremendously significant language is limited to the problem of deceptive
advertising. If so, it provides little assistance regarding the appropriate
scrutiny to be employed in the regulation of truthful advertising. On the
other hand, if its "commonsense differences," "not . . . valueless," and
"different degree of protection" language refers to commercial speech in
general, then the Court obviously was employing a Bigelow-type standard.
Most probably the whole question is illusory, for the term "misleading"
can be defined as broadly as desired.100 If one wishes to justify a
government regulation of commercial speech, one need only say that the
speech would be misleading or deceptive without such a restriction. This,
in essence, supports a Bigelow standard according less protection to
commercial speech, that is, the new commercial speech doctrine.
Upon close examination, it becomes apparent in any event that the
language and content of footnote twenty-four call for a more comprehen-
sive interpretation. 10' In support of this contention are the following: first,
the Court's specific use of the words "close inspection";0 2 second, the
Court's cautious and moderate analysis; third, the broad language of the
first three sentences of the footnote; fourth, the form of the question the
Court posed-whether commercial speech "is wholly outside the
protection of the First Amendment"; 10 3 fifth, the Court's ultimate holding
that a state could not "completely suppress the dissemination of
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of
that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients"; 0 4 and
last, the recent Bigelow decision, also authored by Mr. Justice Blackmun.
The lower degree of protection afforded commercial speech exists
because commercial speech is both less valuable'0 5 and less vulnerable 10 6
99. 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24 (citations omitted).
100. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749,770 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denled,435 U.S.
950 (1978); Reich, Consumer Protection and the First Amendment: A Dilenma for the FTC?, 61
MINN. L. REV. 705 (1977); Note, Yes, FTC, supra note 2.
101. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
102. 425 U.S. at 769. Note that the Court did not state under "closest" or"exacting"inspectlon.
103. Id. at 761. See also Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977).
104. 425 U.S. at 773 (emphasis added).
105. See note 153 infra.
106. See notes 107-09 and accompanying text infra. This is significant in that the primary
criticism of the ad hoc balance, which the Court is here adopting, is its lack of advance warning and
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than other varieties of speech. Concerning the vulnerability of commercial
messages, the Court stated that commercial speech is (1) easier to verify so
that it is "less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements"'0 7 and (2)
"[s]ince advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits," 0 8 more
durable so that mandating accurate and provable statements is less likely
to have a chilling effect. After all, a state has a legitimate interest in
ensuring that commercial information flows "cleanly as well as freely." 1°9
Thus, truthful and legitimate commercial speech is constitutionally
protected, although it is slightly more susceptible to legitimate governmen-
tal regulation than other varieties; in other words, a lower standard of
examination exists. On the other hand, false, deceptive, and misleading
advertisements pose no obstacle to state regulation." °
Thus, a new commercial speech doctrine has surfaced in which a
constitutionally protected area of speech, due to its very nature and its
"commonsense differences," is entitled to a lesser degree of protection.
Significantly, this is the first instance in which the Court has used content
to distinguish an area of protected speech in order to grant it diminished
status.' Will this concept be extended to other categories of speech?
Rather than relegating an area to a Chaplinsky nonspeech category, will
the Court further employ this intermediate approach? Or is this new
principle to be employed exclusively in conjunction with commercial
speech, in light of its "commonsense differences'"?' 12 What effect does this
decision have upon New York Times and Bigelow? Are all forms of
commercial speech, regardless of their content, to be accorded this lower
degree of protection? Are we to continue to distinguish and variably
protect commercial speech depending upon the significance of its
particular message?' 13
It is apparent that the Virginia Pharmacy Board decision leaves some
important questions unanswered. Many of these present the same
confounding problems as the Chrestensen doctrine, on a different level.
hence its potential chilling effect upon speech. See T. EMERsoMN, supra note 27; Nimmer, 77he Rght to
Speak, supra note 27. By pursuing the concept of vulnerability, the Court is able to avoid this criticism.
107. 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
108. Id. In footnote24, the Court further noted that these"commonsense differences" might also
permit certain prior restraints in addition to the prescribed Arnings, disclaimers, or additional
information in the advertisement itself.
109. Id. at 772.
110. 425 U.S. at 771-72. See note 130 and accompanying text infra.
I11. Although one commentator has pointed out that, in the case of libel, the Court has already
separated protected speech from unprotected speech on a content analysis, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 196 (1976), this is the first instance in which the degree of protection has been
based upon content. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (both establishing libel as a category of unprotected-not less
protected-speech). See generally note 189 infra.
112. See Part IV. A. infra for a discussion of these questions concluding that the new doctrine
should not be extended to other areas of speech.
113. See Part IV. A. infra fora discussion ofthese questions concluding that the first amendment
value of the commercial message's content must be taken into consideration in determining whether
full or lesser protection will be accorded.
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Now, instead of determining which types of commercial speech are entitled
to constitutional protection, the lower courts must decide which forms are
entitled to full protection and which are entitled to a lesser degree of
protection.
C. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro:
Some Further Guidance
Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro' 14 presented to the Court a
factual situation closely paralleling that of Virginia Pharmacy Board and
Bigelow. Hence, the Court"5 had little difficulty in resolving the issue in
favor of the free exercise of expression."t 6 The case does, however, provide
some limited additional guidance concerning the nature and extent of the
new commercial speech doctrine.
The Township of Willingboro, after much thought and study, enacted
an ordinance prohibiting the placement of "for sale" and "sold" signs in
front of residential dwellings. The prohibition was designed to stem what
was perceived as a white exodus from the township. Challenging the
ordinance were a New Jersey corporation owning real estate in Willing-
boro and a local real estate agent.
In analyzing this case, two fundamental inquiries must be recognized:
first, the extent to which a state may regulate speech due to its content; and
second, whether this regulation can be considered to restrict reasonable
time, place, or manner. The first inquiry raises once again the crucial issue
of assessing the applicable standard to determine whether protected
commercial speech (as opposed to false, deceptive, or misleading
advertisements) can be regulated. The Court provides some initial
assistance in rejecting the standard of the court of appeals:" 7 that
"commercial speech may be restricted if its 'impact be found detrimental'
by a municipality, and if 'the limitation on any pure speech [as opposed to
commercial speech] element is minimal.' ,,t8 But the Court immediately
restricts any possible expansive interpretation of this thought by stating
that "[a]fter Virginia Pharmacy Board it is clear that commercial speech
cannot be banned because of an unsubstantiated belief that its impact is
'detrimental.' , 119
Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, makes no further
reference to the appropriate standard to be employed. Nevertheless, his
114. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
115. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the unanimous opinion ofthe Court. Mr. Justice Rehnqulst
did not participate in the consideration of the case.
116. The Court noted that, as in Virginia Pharmacy Board, the :;peaker (advertiser), consumer,
and public all had significant first amendment interests. Interestingly, the Court also seemed to be
impressed by the large financial investment that was at stake. Id. at 92.
117. 535 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1976).
118. 431 U.S. at 92 n.6 (quoting 535 F.2d at 795).
119. Id.
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analysis of the constitutionality of the Willingboro ordinance supports the
position that the Court was employing a standard similar to that used in
Bigelow.120 In holding that the balancing of interests favored the free
exercise of expression even when the ordinance advanced an important
governmental objective, the Court in essence found that the government
regulation failed to satisfy all aspects of the new standard.'12 Since the
township failed to demonstrate that it was experiencing massive panic
selling or that this type of ordinance could reduce such sales,122 it could not
demonstrate that its regulation substantially furthered a legitimate state
interest. 23 More importantly, the Court expressed its extreme distaste, as
in Virginia Pharmacy Board, for any regulation that relied u on keeping
the public in ignorance of truthful and vital information.1t  The Court
clearly believes that there are more suitable alternatives to such "highly
paternalistic" suppression of information. 25 Hence, under close inspec-
tion, the first amendment interests were clearly dominant.
It should be noted here that the other reviewable segment of this
decision, that is, the time, place, or manner restriction, although less
significant for the purposes of this article, is the more controversial aspect
of the opinion. The township contended that its ordinance only imposed a
reasonable time, place, or manner restriction-the constitutional validity
of which has long been recognizedt 26 -upon the use of "for sale" and
"sold" signs. The Court, however, was unpersuaded by this assertion; the
ordinance, which only banned placement of specified signs in certain
120. The Bigelow standard, note 73 and accompanying text supra, is a three-part test: a
government regulation that suppresses commercial speech is justified if(l) the state's interest in the
regulation, under close inspection, outweighs the first amendment interests, (2) the regulation
substantially furthers an important (not a compelling) state interest, and (3) the regulation is the least
restrictive alternative. Part(3) of this test is readilysupported throughout the Court's opinion.431 U.S.
at 95-97. It is far more difficult to support elements (1) and (2). The Court, in discussing the merit of
Willingboro's purpose, employs language such as "vital goal," "importance," "substantial benefits,"
"strong national commitment," "important governmental objective," and "strong interest." Obviously,
neither this language nor any other in the opinion conclusively demonstrates that the Court was in fact
employing a close inspection and legitimate purpose standard rather than an exacting scrutiny test.
121. 431 U.S. at 95-97.
122. The Court indicated in footnote 9,431 U.S. at 95, that it was not deciding whether proof of
massive white flight resulting from the use of "for sale" and "sold" signs would affect its decision as it
had the Seventh Circuit's decision in Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974)
(prohibition of "for sale" signs upheld on record showing that signs caused panic selling). Yet even if the
Court had heard such evidence and found it compelling, a problem would remain under part(3) of the
Bigelow standard-i.e., the requirement of the least restrictive alternative. Query, if the Court actually
believed Barrick could survive the Linniark decision, why it did not remand this case fora finding of
facts on the "panic selling" issue.
123. 431 U.S. at 95-97.
124. Id.
125. The Court indicates that the public will be able to absorb all the necessary information and
make its own decisions in what it believes to be its own best interest. Id. at 97;see also Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). In Part Ill of its
opinion, however, the Court reaffirms its position that there are commonsense differences between
commercial speech and pure speech, implying that a township may have added leeway in remedying the
problem.
126. See note 60 supra.
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locations, 127 for all practical purposes barred efficient communication of
the true message. 128 Hence, the Court invalidated the ordinance due to its
impermissible impairment of the free flow of legitimate and truthful
commercial speech.
D. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona:
Another Degree of "Lesser Protection"
The case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona129 reaffirmed the cardinal
principles underlying the commercial speech doctrine, but did not provide
solutions to the unanswered problems left by its predecessors. First, the
decision restated that truthful and legitimate commercial speech is
constitutionally protected, although it did not clarify the appropriate
standard of protection. Second, false, deceptive, and misleading
advertisements were found not to be entitled to constitutional protection
and thus subject to regulation by the states. 130 Finally, the Court found
that "commonsense differences" distinguishing commercial speech from
other varieties justified the application of a different constitutional
standard.
The issue in Bates, however, was extremely narrow: "[W]hether the
State [could] prevent the publication in a newspaper of . . . [a] truthful
advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine legal
services."' 3' This issue was not confronted in Virginia Pharmacy Board,
although the Court's comments suggested a high probability of a positive
answer. 32 In arriving at the opposite result, the Court, speaking through
127. The Court found that the town was not genuinely interested in regulating the manner or
place of signs since it did not prohibit all front lawn signs or all signs with a particular purpose. It
appeared to the Court that the ordinance was aimed at signs containing a specific message. 431 U.S. at
93-94.
128. The Court was of the opinion that there was no economically feasible alternative means of
communicating the desired message since both "newspaper advertising and listing with real estate
agents" were significantly more costly and perhaps even less effective. Id, at 93.
129. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
130. This near carte blanche regulation of false, misleading, and deceptive commercial speech Isjustified by the fact that any benefit derived from this type of speech depends entirely upon its
truthfulness and accuracy. A consumer's economic decision-making process is facilitated only if
factual and reliable information is provided. Furthermore, it is unlikely that opposing viewpoints
would be generally available to the public.
131. 433 U.S. at 384. Appellants John R. Bates and Van O'Steen, licensed attorneys in the state
of Arizona, placed an advertisement in a local Phoenix newspaper in order to increase their legal
clinic's clientele. Knowing that the advertisement violated Arizona's disciplinary code, the two
challenged the constitutionality of the code's blanket suppression of attorney advertising in tile
disciplinary action brought by the state bar association. The advertisement merely stated that the clinic
provided services at "very reasonable fees" and went on to describe five services and the fees charged for
these services: (I) uncontested divorces-$175 plus $20 filing fee; (2) "do your own" divorce packet-
$100; (3) uncontested adoption-225 plus publication cost; (4) individual, uncontested bankruptcy-
$250 plus $55 filing fee or $300 plus $11 0 filing fee forjoint bankruptcy; (5) change of name-595 plus
$20 filing fee. Id. at 385. The Arizona Supreme Court ultimately upheld their convictions but reduced
the penalty to censure.
132. The Court indicated that there is a significant difference between physicians and lawyers-
who render professional services of infinite variety-and pharmacists. 425 U.S. at 773 n,25. See I(. at
774 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also id. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Mr. Justice Blackmun, 133 first undertook a comprehensive review of its
holding in Virginia Pharmacy Board. In relying upon that decision, Mr.
Justice Blackmun was careful to point out that the information provided
was truthful and legitimate (and could not in any sense be deemed
misleading), that the alternative course of action chosen by the state
regulatory body was to maintain the public in ignorance, 34 and that the
regulation's application to attorneys was not sufficient to distinguish the
controversy. This last point, however, must be considered in light of the
narrow question posed by the Court.
135
Arrayed against the first amendment interests 136 were the numerous
justifications proffered by the state, 37 which the Court refuted one by
one. 3 8 At this juncture the Court provided an additional basis for the
lesser degree of protection offered commercial speech (the others being the
lack of constitutional protection for false, misleading, and deceptive
advertisements and the less demanding judicial review standard in
general). Rather than terminate the case once it determined that the
blanket suppression of legal advertisements would suppose some
constitutionally protected speech, the Court proceeded to analyze whether
the advertisement in question was outside the scope of the first
amendment. The Court reasoned that the overbreadth doctrine, 139 which
in the typical first amendment case would have been sufficient to uphold
133. Mr. Justice Blackmun, in the first amendment portion of his decision, was joined by
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens. The Chief Justice and Justices Stewart, Powell, and
Rehnquist dissented.
134. From both Virginia Pharmacy Board and Uinmark it is apparent that the Court finds
paternalistic maintenance of ignorance a particularly unacceptable alternative.
135. The Court specifically stated that it was not dealing with advertising claims that related to
quality of performance or with in-person solicitation. 433 U.S. at366. Moreover, the Court specifically
limited its decision to newspaper advertisements pertaining to price of"routine legal services," which it
carefully avoided defining. Id. at 384.
136. Interestingly, the Court did not attempt to enumerate the firstamendment interests that are
implicated in a commercial speech setting, evidently believing that these had been sufficiently described
in Virginia Pharmacy Board.
137. Thejustifications offered were: (I) the adverse effect on professionalism; (2) the inherently
misleading nature of attorney advertising, (3) the negative effect on our system of justice; (4) the
increased costs of advertising, (5) the adverse effect on quality of services rendered; and (6) the
administrative enforcement problems. 433 U.S. at 368-79.
138. Taking the state bar's arguments in order, the Court responded that: (1) the public is well
aware that attorneys are engaged in earning a livelihood; (2) it is never preferable to keep the public in
ignorance; (3) any increase in the amount of litigation is perfectly proper so long as wrongs are being
remedied; (4) it is just as likely that advertising will lower costs and ease entry barriers; (5) an attorney
who will perform shoddy work will do so regardless of his ability to advertise; and (6) it is inconsistent
to argue that attorneys are virtuous individuals and then argue that they will utilize advertising to
commit wrongs. Id. at 368-74. Ironically, the Court, in the antitrust segment of its opinion, noted a
strong justification for state control of attorneys:
[RIegulation of the activities of the bar is at the core of the State's power to protect the public.
Indeed, this Court in Goldfarb acknowledged that "[t]he interest of the States in regulating
lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of
administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of the courts.'"
Id. at 361-62 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 42t U.S. 773, 792 (1975)).
139. See note 53 supra.
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Bates' attack, 140 had little application in the field of commercial speech. 14
Once again, this distinction was based upon the "commonsense difference"
in the vulnerability of commercial speech and other varieties.141
Significantly, the Court also verified the notion that the "commonsense
differences" language and the other teachings of footnote twenty-four of
Virginia Pharmacy Board apply to commercial speech in general, not just
to deceptive advertisements.
43
Having concluded that, on the narrow issue presented, the balance of
interests favored the first amendment, the Bates Court proceeded to the
second level of its new commercial speech analysis.' 44 As in Virginia
Pharmacy Board, the Court examined whether any justification existed to
permit the regulation of constitutionally protected speech. 145 Having
determined that there was no such justification, the Court merely ruled
that truthful and legitimate price advertisements concerning routine legal
services could not be suppressed from newspaper publication.
146
E. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association: The Supreme Court
Resolves Some Uncertainties of the New Commercial
Speech Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court recently decided two companion
cases concerning the constitutional protection to be accorded in-person
and mail solicitation by attorneys-Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Associa-
tion ' and In re Primus.'" In Ohralik, Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the
Court,14 9 held that the solicitation 50 perpetrated by attorney Ohralik was
140. 433 U.S. at 379-81. "In the First Amendment context, the Court has permitted attacks on
overly broad statutes without requiring that the person making the attack demonstrate that in fact his
specific conduct was protected." Id. at 380.
141. Id. at 380-81. See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 n.20 (1978).
142. 433 U.S. at 380-81 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24, 775-81 (1976)).
143. 433 U.S. at 380-81.
144. The same analysis was utilized in Virginia Pharmacy Board. See notes 81, 98, and
accompanying text supra.
145. The Court, as it had in Virginia Pharmacy Board, mentioned the following permissible
forms of commercial speech regulation: (1) restrictions upon false, deceptive, and misleading
advertisements; (2) reasonable time, place, or manner restriction;; (3) prohibitions upon the
advertising of illegal transactions; and (4) reasonable restrictions upon the use of the electronic media,
433 U.S. at 383-84.
146. "iT]he Court [in Bates] ruled that the justifications for prohibiting truthful, 'restrained'
advertising concerning'the availability and terms of routine legal services' arc insufficient" to override
the constitutional interest. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 454 (1978).
147. Id. at 454.
148. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). In re Primus held, predominantly under a freedom of association
theory, that the first amendment protected an attorney who, on behalf of the American Civil Liberties
Union and without remuneration, wrote to a woman to inform her that she would be represented free
of charge if she elected to sue the physician who sterilized her.
149. Mr. Justice Powell was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun,
and Stevens. Justices Rehnquist and Marshall filed concurring opinions, while Mr. Justice Brennan
did not participate in the decision.
150. Mr. Justice Marshall termed the activities "classic examples of'ambulance chasing.' "436
U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring).
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
not constitutionally protected. A state "may discipline a lawyer for
soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely
to pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent."
15
'
Ohralik was distinguishable from Bates on both sides of the ad hoe
balance-not only was the state's interest more powerful but the first
amendment interest was also not as compelling. Presented with a situation
in which it could, for the first time, apply its new commercial speech
doctrine to resolve a controversy against the defendant's first amendment
interests, the Court took the opportunity to clarify some of the test's
ambiguities. First, the Court clearly established that all commercial
speech-not just deceptive advertising-is distinguishable from other
varieties of speech.' 52 Second, Mr. Justice Powell significantly stated that
the Court has afforded commercial speech "a limited measure of
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of
First Amendment values,"' 53 thus confirming the belief that commercial
speech is accorded its lower degree of protection not only because it is less
vulnerable but also because it is less valuable. Third, the Court found that
the government may suppress commercial speech in some instances in
which the suppression of pure speech would not be tolerated. 5 4 Fourth,
the opinion recognizes that laws regulating, for example, securities,
antitrust, and labor 55 commonly make it illegal to pursue a course of
conduct that necessarily implicates speech. Last, the Court indicates that a
compelling interest need not be presented by the state in support of its
regulation, but only a legitimate or important state interest.15F
The Ohralik decision thus completely substantiates the existence of a
new commercial speech doctrine comprised of the elements discussed
above. 57 It fails, however, to resolve some basic questions concerning the
151. Id. at 449.
152. Id. at 455-56. Moreover, Ohralik's in-person solicitation did "not stand on a par with
truthful advertising about the availability and terms of routine legal services, let alone with forms of
speech more traditionally within the concern of the First Amendment." Id. at 455.
153. Id. at 456 (emphasis added). This holding was inevitable in light of the grave difficulty the
courts would encounter if they sought to apply a mere "less vulnerable" standard. As suggested in The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 198, 206-07 (1977), this standard became unworkable
when the Court indicated that attorneys would receive less first amendment protection than pure
product advertisements, even though attorney advertisements are obviously more difficult to verifyand
less durable.
154. 436 U.S. at 456.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 462. The Court specifically stated:
We need not discuss or evaluate each of these interests in detail as appellant has conceded
that the State has a legitimate and indeed "compelling" interest in preventing those aspects of
solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms
of "vexatious conduct." Brief for Appellant 25. We agree that protection of the public from
these aspects of solicitation is a legitimate and important state interest.
[Appellant has conceded] that strong state interests justify regulation ....
Id. See also note 73 and accompanying text supra. It could be argued, however, that this restrained
scope of judicial scrutiny is due to the conduct element of the speech and not its commercial aspects.
157. The most troubling aspect of the Court's opinion in Ohralik is its failure to pursue the
question of less drastic alternatives. See generally Note, Less Drastic M4eans, supra note 64. The
omission tends to substantiate the notion that this principle frequently announces a result rather than
explaining it.
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extent of this new doctrine's applicability both within commercial
speech-will use of the doctrine vary with the content of the message?1 8-
and beyond-will the doctrine be extended to other areas of speech?
IV. TOWARD A NEW COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS FOR FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY
A. The New Commercial Speech Doctrine: Its
Content and Justification
The recent Supreme Court cases analyzed in the preceding section
establish a two-tiered ad hoc balancing test to determine the constitutional
validity of governmental regulations that suppress commercial expression.
The first level of analysis weighs under close scrutiny the implicated first
amendment interests 159 against the state's justification for its regulation,
with particular focus upon whether the regulation substantially furthers a
legitimate state interest and whether a less drastic alternative is avail-
able. 160 Although this standard is less rigorous than the traditional
first amendment test to determine the propriety of content regulation-
exacting scrutiny to determine whether a compelling state interest
exists 1-it is far from undemanding. Five of the six cases analyzed above
resulted in decisions favorable to the first amendment interests.
62
This new and modified freedom of speech standard is appropriate in
the area of commercial speech due to the "commonsense differences"
between it and other forms of speech. Commercial speech is both less
valuable and less vulnerable than noncommercial speech and hence is
entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection. Expression of a
commercial nature, however, is "not valueless" and is therefore entitled to
a certain degree of protection under the first amendment. It simply does
not merit' 63 the lofty, preferred164 position accorded "pure" speech in our
158. Nonetheless, In re Primus and Ohralik taken together lend strong support to the view that
the New York Times rationale is applicable to the new commercial speech doctrine, See notes 163-65
and accompanying text infra.
159. In Virginia Pharmacy Board and Linmark the Court carefully examined the various
interests in the speech (Le., the interests of advertiser, the consumer, and the public in general), see
notes 84-89 and accompanying text supra, whereas in Bates the Court did not feel the need to reiterate
this analysis and merely relied upon its reasoning in the prior two cases.
160. The second tier of the analysis will not be discussed again because it does not differ from
that used for noncommercial speech, i.e., is there any appropriate %ay to regulate this form of
protected speech? See notes 60, 98, 126, 127, 144-46 and accompanying text supra.
161. See note 64 supra.
162. The lone exception was Ohralik, a case clearly presenting a factual situation worthy of
government regulation.
163. A complete analysis of this matter is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Z.
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, & B. NEUaORN, EMERSON,
HABER AND DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-59 (4th ed. 1976)
(containing excerpts from Milton's Areopagitica and J.S. Mill's On Liberty); T. EMERSON, supra note
27; A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 77; Brennan, supra note 60; Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special
Nature of Political Speech, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 1. Compare Baker, supra note 2 with Redish, supra
note 77. Compare also both of these latter articles with the prior authorities.
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constitutional system of democracy. It has been said that the first
amendment
protects two kinds of interests in free speech. There is an individual interest,
the need of many men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if life
is worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the
country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the
wisest way.
Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn, the leading spokesman concerning the social
aspect of the first amendment over the last half century,' 66 reasoned thatin
our system of self-government the electorate must be properly informed to
render enlightened decisions. The rulers, who are also the ruled in the
American process, must be receptive to debate and must not foreclose it
because it is false or dangerous. This concept was roundly supported by the
Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan: "The constitutional
safeguard, we have said,'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.' ,167 This country has "a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open."'168 Erroneous statements are "inevitable in free debate,
and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
'breathing space' that they'need . . . to survive.' ,,169 In the Court's view,
commercial speech is simply not deserving of such esteemed deference.170
Equally decisive in determining that commercial speech is not entitled
to complete first amendment protection is its diminished vulnerability.'17
"Since advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely
that such speech is particularly susceptible' 72 to being chilled by
reasonable government regulations. Accordingly, the lower degree of
protection afforded to commercial speech does not (1) permit the
application of the first amendment overbreadth doctrine, 73 (2) prevent the
prohibition of false, misleading, and deceptive advertisement, 17 4 (3)
164. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 60, at 639-74, and authorities cited therein. See also author-
ities cited supra note 163.
165. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 163.
166. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
765 n.19. See generally A. MEIKLFJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); A. MEIKLEJOIIN, FREE SPEncl
AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absohte,
1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 245.
167. 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1967)).
168. Id. at 270.
169. Id. at 271-72. Moreover, the individual self-fulfillment obtained from political, social, or
literary speech has no parallelin commercial speech. SeeT. EMERSON,supra note 27, at IO nA6; Baker,
supra note2. See also First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,435 U.S. 765,804-05 (1978) (White,J.,
dissenting).
170. 376 U.S. at 271-72.
171. See notes 106-09 and accompanying text supra.
172. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977).
173. See notes 139-43 and accompanying text supra.
174. See note 130 and accompanying text supra.
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prevent the requirement that an advertiser verify his message, 17 (4)
prevent the appropriate requirement that the advertisements include such
information, warnings, or disclaimers as necessary, 76 or (5) prevent the
proper use of prior restraints upon commercial information.
Based upon these distinctions, value and vulnerability, the Court in
Virginia Pharmacy Board and Ohralik was correct in concluding that
"speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction' ,178
does not deserve treatment comparable to that afforded "pure" speech.
Commercial speech that does more, however, is entitled to full
constitutional protection. Hence, the New York Times rationale is left
unscathed by the new doctrine. 179 It is obvious that this development will
do nothing to diminish the workload of the judicial system; there are,
however, no reasonable or constitutionally sound alternatives. A court
need only take into account in its balancing the commercial or
noncommercial nature of the message and adjust its balance according to
the extent of the commerciality-"a small price to pay for the continued
preservation of so precious a liberty as free speech."' 180 Moreover, the
discretion to be exercised in adjusting this sliding scale is severely limited to
the narrow channel between close inspection and exacting scrutiny.
Another issue that arises is whether this new doctrine should be
applied to other areas of speech. Rather than relegate an area to total lack
of protection, as has been done, for example, with obscenity, why not use
this intermediate approach and merely grant less protection? This is
apparently what the plurality attempted to accomplish in Young v,
American Mini Theatres, Inc.8 ' In that case, the plurality, 18 2 relying upon
previous libel' 83 and commercial speech'84 decisions, held that a city could
175. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,772
n.24 (1976).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973)).
179. See also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
180. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 321 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
182. In American Mini Theatres, the Court was presented with three issues concerning the
propriety of a Detroit zoning ordinance that prohibited the location of a "regulated" establishment
within 1000 feet of any two regulated uses or within 500 feet of a residential neighborhood. The term
"regulated use" was statutorily defined to include, inter alia, adult movie theaters, adult book stores,
hotels or motels, pawnshops, and pool halls. The respondents offered three arguments in support of
their contention that the ordinance was constitutionally infirm: (1) that the ordinance was void for
vagueness; (2) that the ordinance constituted an illegal prior restraint upon speech; and (3) that the
ordinance unconstitutionally classified certain movie theaters based upon the content of their films,
The Court was able to muster a majority on the first two issues (Mr. Justice Stevens was joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist) but not on the third and most important
question (Mr. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion). Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and
Blackmun dissented.
183. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
184. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976). The American Mini Theatres decision was rendered prior to Linmark, Bates, and Ohrallk.
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properly impose specific restrictions upon "adult" movie theaters based
upon the content of their offerings, namely, sexually explicit films. It was
the plurality's belief that such expression was less valuable'8 5 than political
or social speech and that although such expression was protected by the
first amendment, the state might nevertheless "legitimately use [its]
content" as a basis for separate classification and hence protection." 6 The
plurality felt that prior Supreme Court decisions to the contrary (holding
that the government was absolutely forbidden from restricting expression
based upon its subject matter or content)'8 7 were overly broad and not
absolute. After all, the plurality asserted, the Court has recognized (in the
areas of libel and commercial speech) that the constitutional protection of
speech may vary with content. The plurality did, however, specifically
acknowledge that the government has a "paramount obligation of
neutrality" and could not regulate speech based upon its "social, political
or philosophical message."' 88
Although the plurality's reliance on these two areas is misplaced," 9 its
ultimate holding may nevertheless be proper, since American Mini
Theatres presented closely related questions of state power to regulate land
use 190 and strong governmental interest in maintaining the quality of
185. A majority of the Court, in disposing of the threshold question of vagueness in favor of the
city of Detroit, found that "there is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material
that is on the borderline between pornography and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of
ideas of social and political significance." 427 U.S. at 61 (emphasis added). The plurality also found it to
be "manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression [nonobscene eroticspeech] is of
a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate." Id. at 70
(emphasis added). Finally, a majority of the Court also ruled that the ordinance did not constitute an
unlawful prior restraint.
186. Id. at 70-71. "Even though the First Amendment protects communication in this area from
total suppression, we hold that the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis
for placing them in a different classification from other motion pictures." Id.
187. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Police Dep't v. Mosley,408 U.S.92
(1972). The dissenting Justices, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Stewart, believed that these two
decisions were dispositive. In fact, Justice Stewart stated that the restriction in American Mini
Theatres "precisely parallels the content restriction" employed in Ernozik, a case that had just been
decided the previous term. 427 U.S. at 88. It was the dissenters' view that the Court must never apply
first amendment protection based upon the perceived value of the speech. The Court, they implored,
must protect distasteful and offensive speech as well as "important" ideas and expressions:
The Court must never forget that the consequences of rigorously enforcing the
guarantees of the First Amendment are frequently unpleasant. Much speech that seems to be
of little or no value will enter the marketplace of ideas, threatening the quality of our social
discourse and, more generally, the serenity of our lives. But that is the price to be paid for
constitutional freedom.
Id.
188. Id. at 70.
189. A complete analysis of this misplaced reliance is beyond the scope of this article, but it is
clear that the libel argument is inapposite for several reasons. First, there is a unique historical
relationship between the first amendment and libel. See Gertzv. Robert Welch, Inc.,418 U.S. 323,369
(1974) (White, J., dissenting); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Second, the trend
in the libel area is toward providing first amendment protection, whereas in this case the plurality is
seeking to grant less constitutional protection. Third, the protection accorded in libel cases does not
depend upon the content of the questioned speech, but upon a definitional balancing of two
fundamental interests (speech and reputation). See T. E.%IERsoN, supra note 27. Last, there is a
difference regarding the chilling effect upon other speech.
190. Mr. Justice Powell, who joined with the four plurality Justices in Parts I and 1I, could not
join in Part III of the opinion. It was his belief that the plurality was mistaken in invoking a system of
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neighborhoods.' 91 Moreover, the plurality recognized as the essential
question whether the state could properly restrict the location where adult
films might be exhibited-not whether they could be suppressed
completely. 192
The plurality's reliance upon Virginia Pharmacy Board and the new
commercial speech doctrine is inapposite for several reasons. The new
doctrine establishing that commercial speech merits partial constitutional
protection is premised upon both its lesser value andlesser vulnerability as
compared with other varieties of speech. By contrast, in American Mini
Theatres the questioned speech was stripped of constitutional protection
solely for its lack of value. The Court in Virginia Pharmacy Board
primarily focused upon the aspect of vulnerability in granting commercial
speech some protection and did not actively pursue the aspect of value
until subsequent decisions. Clearly, the vulnerability of nonobscene erotic
speech is not less than that of other varieties of speech; in fact, it is, if
anything, more vulnerable. Unlike commercial speech, which is the sine
qua non of profits and hence the very existence of a business, nonobscene
erotic speech might easily be chilled. Moreover, to say that such speech is
less valuable raises numerous fundamental questions and possibilities for
serious abuse. If we permit ourjudicial system to rank various categories of
constitutionally protected speech in order of their "value," granting each
category a different degree of protection, we will severely handicap the first
amendment. As the dissenters recognized in American Mini Theatres, in
order to preserve the precious guarantee of freedom of speech, we must
tolerate some insensitive and offensive remarks. This is not, however, to
assert that the ultimate holding in American Mini Theatres is incorrect,
but only that its reliance upon and expansion of the new commercial
speech doctrine is totally unjustified. The propriety of such a ruling can lie
only in its limited interference with free speech in the furtherance of a
compelling state interest in the efficient and legitimate regulation of land
use.
What appears to be occurring today is that the Supreme Court's
earlier battles concerning "offensive speech '93 are resurfacing and the new
content regulation. He viewed the case as simply "presenting an example of innovative land-use
regulation, implicating First Amendment concerns only incidentally and toa limited extent."427 U.S.
at 73. In arriving at this conclusion, which has much merit, Justice Powell employed the standard
established in O'Brien, contending that the ordinance was merely it place restriction and not a
regulation pertaining to content. See United Statesv. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968); note 60.supra.
Here, Justice Powell appears to have overlooked the fact that the ordinance affects only certain types of
movies based upon their content. Nevertheless, Justice Powell's analysis might result in the same
conclusion under the applicable exacting scrutiny standard since, as he recognized, the state's interest
in effective land use regulation is extremely strong and the impact of the Detroit ordinance upon
speech was only minimal. "The ordinance is addressed only to the places at which this type of expres-
sion may be presented [which are abundant], a restriction that does not interfere with content,"
427 U.S. at 78-79.
191. Even Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent recognized this point. Id. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting),
192. See id. 70-72 & n.35.
193. See, e.g., Er'znoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408
U.S. 914 (1972); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S,
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commercial speech doctrine is being used as a device by which regulation
can be justified. In retrospect, these earlier cases accurately predicted how
most of the Justices would vote in the situation represented by American
Mini Theatres.19 4 Regardless of this revived conflict and its ultimate
outcome, it is an egregious error for any element of the Court to employ
Virginia Pharmacy Board and its progeny to influence the result. The two
distinct lines of decisions are simply not comparable; any modification of
the offensive speech holdings must be independently derived. The new
commercial speech doctrine and its rationale should not be extended to
other, noncommercial types of speech without serious thought and
compelling reason.
Recent litigation suggests that the legal doctrines that affect com-
mercial speech are in an accelerated state of development. Accordingly,
this article will now briefly analyze several recent cases in order to further
define the parameters and mechanics of the new commercial speech
doctrine.
B. Some Additional Parameters of the New Commercial
Speech Doctrine: A Review of Recent Decisions
The final United States Supreme Court decision that will be examined
in this article is First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti"' In Bellotti, the
Court held that a Massachusetts statute prohibiting banks and business
corporations from expending funds "for the purpose of. . . influencing
or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than
901 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California 403 U.S. 15 (1971). These
cases hold that offensive speech not amounting to "fighting words" is constitutionally protected.
194. The following chart summarizes the various Justices' voting records on the decisions cited
in the preceding note and indicates (1) how, based on that record, they would be expected to vote in
American Mini Theatres and (2) how, in fact, they did vote in that case. Added weight should begiven
to the Erznoznik case because of its similarity to American Mini 7heatres.
Mini Mini
77eatres Theatres
Cohen' Gooding Brown' Lewis* Rosenfeld' Erznoznik' Anticipated Actual
Burger Diss. Diss. Diss. Diss. Diss. Diss. A A
Brennan Maj. Maj. Maj. Maj. Maj. Maj. F F
Stewart Maj. Maj. Maj. Maj. Maj. Maj. F F
White Diss. Maj. Maj. Maj. Maj. Diss. F? A
Marshall Maj. Maj. Maj. Maj. Maj. Maj. F F
Blackmun Diss. Diss. Diss. Diss. Diss. Maj. A F
Powell t b b c c Diss. Maj. ? d
Rehnquist b b Diss. Diss. Diss. Diss. A A
Stevens b b b b b b ? A
A = against protection of the offensive speech
F = for protection of the offensive speech
a = the majority opinion in each of these cases favored protection for the offensive speech at issue.
b = did not participate in decision.
c = concurred in result.
d = took intermediate position in concurring opinion.
195. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the
corporation"' 96 was violative of the first amendment. Significantly, the
Court197 in so holding focused upon the right of the listeners to receive
information that is "intimately related to the process of governing."'"
It is ironic that in granting the petition of the corporate parties to have
the statute declared constitutionally infirm, the Supreme Court Justices,
nearly unanimously, reversed their traditional first amendment positions.
This reversal, however, was prompted not by the fir;t amendment issue per
se but by its interplay with the question of corporate constitutional rights.
The dissenters argued that a state could prevent a corporation from using
corporate funds for purposes not materially affecting its business.'99 The
majority, on the other hand, although embracing first amendment
protection, did not support the position that corporations were entitled to
political rights equivalent to those of natural individuals. They merely
adhered to Meiklejohn's principle 00 that the electorate had a right to be
informed, through whatever source, concerning the fundamental workings
of government. The issue, they believed, was not "whether and to what
extent corporations have First Amendment rights, '20' but whether the
Massachusetts statute "abridges expression that the First Amendment was
meant to protect.,
20 2
By adhering to Meiklejohn's interpretation of the first amendment,
the Court implicitly lent credence to the concept of a hierarchical system of
values and degrees of protection under the amendment, with political
debate holding the preeminent position. "The speech proposed by
appellants is at the heart of the First Amendment's protection . . . . It is
the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy."203
When a governmental restriction is directed at this type of speech, "'the
State may prevail only upon showing [under exacting scrutiny] a
196. Id. at 768.
197. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion in which he was joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens. Oddly, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Rehnquist
all dissented; Justice Rehnquist, however, filed a separate dissent.
198. 435 U.S. at 786. This is clearly a Meiklejohnian analysis.
199. Mr. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, noted that ira statecould tot
prevent such expenditures, the laws of3l states and the Federal Corrupt Practices Act were in serious
jeopardy. Id. at 803 (White, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Rehnquist asserted that corporations are mere
creatures of the states and can be controlled accordingly. Id. at 823-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), But
query whether the power to prohibit the very existence of the corporation also gives the state the power
to deny it lesser rights or privileges.
200. See generally notes 166-69 and accompanying text supra. The Court specifically stated tlat
political speech is the heart of the first amendment, that the first amendment was designed to protect
iree discussion of governmental affairs, and that free speech is the essence ofself-government. 435 U.S.
at 776-77 & nn.1 I & 12. The Court, in addition to citing Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn's Free Speech and
Its Relation to Self-Government, supra note 77, also referred to two previous Supreme Court cases that
have been acknowledged as being Meiklejohnian in nature-Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964),
and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 435 U.S. at 777 nn.ll & 12.
201. 435 U.S. at 775-76.
202. Id. at 776.
203. Id. at 776-77 & n.1 1. The following authorities were cited: Thornhill v, Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 101-02 (1940); T. EMERSON, supra note 27, at 9; A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 77, at 24-26.
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subordinating interest which is compelling.' ,204 It is possible that a less
rigorous standard would be applicable to less valuable speech, such as the
standard already applied to commercial speech. Although this position
was not expressly adopted by the Bellotti Court, it is not difficult to find
support for such a proposition in the opinion.
205
Complementing Bellotti are three recent decisions of the United
States courts of appeals pertaining to the implementation of the new
commercial speech doctrine. Two of these decisions deal with remedies
(least intrusive alternative and corrective advertising); the third also
concerns the degree of protection to be afforded commercial speech.
In the most recent of these cases, National Commission on Egg
Nutrition v. FTC,2° the Seventh Circuit had to decide whether to classify
the relevant advertisement as a purely commercial advertisement or a New
York Times type advertisement. The National Commission on Egg
Nutrition (NCEN), an egg producers' trade association, was organized in
an attempt to combat the damage being done to the egg industry by the
anticholesterol forces. In its attempt to achieve this goal, the FederalTrade
Commission (FTC) alleged that NCEN made several false and misleading
statements in its advertising campaign. Principally, the FTC contended
and subsequently ruled that it was an unfair trade practice for NCEN to
represent "that there is no scientific evidence that eating eggs increases the
risk of . . .heart [and circulatory] disease . . ,,20' Moreover, in
addition to ordering the NCEN to cease and desist from the above-
mentioned representation, and several others, the FTC ordered that (1)
any reference made to the relationship between cholesterol (and hence
eggs) and circulatory disease be accompanied by a conspicuous statement
that many medical authorities believe that eating cholesterol might in-
204. 435 U.S. at 786 (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
205. A final point that must be made with respect to this decision is that Mr. Justice White has
taken a disturbingly archaic and myopic perspective in his dissenting opinion concerning the role of
corporate social responsibility. Mr. Justice White totally subordinates any notion of the ethical
investor or corporate social responsibility. See generally H. BowEN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
BUSINESS MAN (1953); P. DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT(1945); W. GREVNWOOD, ISSUES IN
BUSINESS AND SOcIETY (1977); R. HEILBRONNER, IN TiE NAME OF PROFIT(1972); J. SIstox, C. PowERS,
& J. GUNNEMAN, THE ETHICAL INVESTOR: UNIVERSITIES AND CORPORATE REsPoNsIBILUTY (1972);
Davis, The Case For and Against Business Assumption of Social Reponsibility, 16 ACAD.
MANAGEMENT J. 312-13 (1972).
Furthermore, Mr. Justice White asserts that since a corporation cannot possibly speak on behalf
of a multitude of shareholders with divergent views, corporate funds should not be expended for the
advancement of "political and social issues that have no material connection with or effect upon their
business, property, or assets." 435 U.S. at 806 (White, J., dissenting). What Mr. Justice White fails to
realize is that the logical extension of his argument leads to the same result that obtained in the 19th
century-namely, that charitable and public donations by corporations are impermissible, ultra vires
acts. Clearly, modem notions of corporate responsibility cannot accommodate such a restriction on
corporate activity.
206. 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977).
207. Id. at 159. In an earlier proceeding before the Seventh Circuit, the court of appeals had
reversed the district court in ordering that a temporary injunction be issued against NCEN barring it
from continuing its allegedly deceptive practices but permitting it to fairly present its side of the
controversial issue. FTC v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976).
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crease the risk of heart or circulatory disease, 0 8 and (2) any representation
disparaging the scientific evidence connecting cholesterol and heart and
circulatory disease is forbidden. 0 9
NCEN, in defense of its statement, asserted that (1) the statement was
true,210 (2) even if not true, the statement was constitutionally protected by
the first amendment, (3) even if the statement was not constitutionally
protected, the FTC order was unconstitutionally vague,211 and (4) the FTC
order was unconstitutionally overbroad.
The second of these contentions, that is, the first amendment
argument, was the most strenuously pursued.212 Judge Tone, however,
properly resolved this issue. He initially pointed out that the new
commercial speech doctrine does not prevent the states from dealing
effectively with the question of false, misleading, or deceptive adver-
tisements.213 He then proceeded to answer the more difficult question,
whether NCEN's advertisements fit into the paradigm of commercial
speech, that is, " 'speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction.' ,,214 He found that the nature or purpose of the communica-
tion "is not changed when a group of sellers joins in advertising their
common product.
21 5
An advertisement will not, and should not, be raised to the level of
New York Times speech merely because it discusses an important and
controversial issue of legitimate public concern. The courts must delve into
the purpose of the advertisement and the potential harm to the consuming
public. Like the Seventh Circuit in Egg Nutrition, they must not be
hesitant to prevent an advertiser from misleading consumers under the veil
of important public debate.216 Once again, the courts must exercise their
208. 570 F.2d at 159-60.
209. id. at 160.
210. NCEN apparently went too far in this regard. The court found that NCEN had" 'done
more than espouse one side of a genuine controversy. . . . It has made statements denying the
existence of scientific evidence which the record clearly shows does exist. These statements are,
therefore, false and misleading.'" Id. at 161 (quoting from its earlier opinion, 517 F.2d at 489).
211. The court ruled against this assertion on the grounds that the challenged language wts as
specific as possible and that administrative orders must have a certain degree of flexibility in order to
prevent future similar illegal occurrences. Id. at 164.
212. NCEN relied upon Virginia Pharmacy Board, Bigelow, and New York rnes in asserting
that commercial misrepresentation is not actionable unless it is made deliberately or with a reckless
indifference to its truth or falsity. Id. at 162.
213. Id. See notes 99-110, 130, and accompanying text supra. See also Young v. American Mini
Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68 n.31 (1976) (affirmatively citing the earlier Egg Nutrition decision, 517
F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975)).
214. 570 F.2d at 162 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976)).
215. 570 F.2d at 163.
216. Judge Tone, quoting from the FTC opinion stated:
Publications designed to convey the point that consumption of a particular product, will not
increase the risk of heart disease, are clearly likely to induce the purchase of that product. The
fact that the message is conveyed by means of selected quotations from the works of scientists
and popular writers does not alter the commercial character of the publication. Nor is it
altered by self-serving professions of eleemosynary intent, e.g. "Brought to you in the public
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discretion-but must be careful not to abdicate their paramount
constitutional obligation.
The court was more sympathetic to NCEN's contention that the
FTC's affirmative disclosure order2 17 was an overly broad remedial
decree.218 It held that the first amendment prohibited a remedy "broader
than that which is necessary." 219 And, since the order directed NCEN to
argue that the other side of the issue rather than merely acknowledge the
existence of the controversy, it unduly infringed upon NCEN's freedom of
speech.220
In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit relied upon an earlier
case, Beneficial Corp. v. FTC.22' In that case, the FTC brought a deceptive
trade practice action against Beneficial Corporation on two grounds: (1)
that Beneficiars "instant tax refund" loan deceived customers; and (2) that
Beneficial improperly utilized information it had received in its tax
preparation business to further its loan operation. Concerning the first and
more important issue, the FTC contended that advertising a tax refund
loan or instant tax refund was deceptive in that the loan was not in any way
connected with a tax refund but was merely Beneficiars everyday loan
based on the applicant's creditworthiness. The latter issue was easily
resolved against Beneficial since the record showed that Beneficial had in
fact improperly used its tax information to solicit loan customers.2
In Beneficial, the Third Circuit found the FTC's remedial order-
which prohibited the use of the words "instant tax refund" altogether-
unconstitutional because it did not invoke the least intrusive restriction
upon the protected commercial speech. It held that the FTC "must start
from the premise that any prior restraint is suspect, and that a remedy,
even for deceptive advertising, can go no further than is necessary for the
elimination of the deception."223 On first reading, this would appear to
interest." If anything the misleading effect of respondents' advertisements is enhanced by
casting them in the guise ofa "public service message" presented by an unidentified "National
Commission7.
Id. (footnote omitted).
217. See note 208 and accompanying text supra.
218. The Court relied on Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976). cert. denied, 430
U.S. 983 (1977) and distinguished Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978). Beneficial is discussed at notes 221-29 and accompanying text infra,
Warner-Lambert is discussed at notes 236-45 and accompanying text infra.
219. 570 F.2d at 164.
220. Ultimately, the court amended the order, upon a motion by the FTC, to hold that(1) the
NCEN cannot disseminate any advertisement that represents that the consumption of eggs or
cholesterol does not enhance the risk of heart or circulatory disease unless it conspicuously discloses
that a controversy exists surrounding this contention and that the advertisement is merely stating its
position and (2) that NCEN cannot disseminate any advertisement that presents scientific evidence
supporting the position that the consumption of eggs andlor cholesterol does not increase the
consumer's risk of heart or circulatory disease unless it conspicuously discloses that many medical
authorities are of the belief that the eating of eggs (cholesterol) does, based on scientific evidence,
increase one's risk of heart or circulatory ailment. Id. at 165-66.
221. 542 F.2d 611 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
222. Id. at 621.
223. Id. at 620.
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conflict with the language in Virginia Pharmacy Board, in which the
Supreme Court stated that the first amendment did not present an obstacle
to the states' effective handling of deceptive advertisements.224 These two
statements are, nonetheless, perfectly consistent-unlike other types of
speech, deceptive or false advertising can be regulated by a state, but the
state must employ the least intrusive alternative. This rule is particularly
pertinent in controversies in which the court is mandating the incorpora-
tion of an affirmative disclosure in future advertisements that themselves
were enjoined from being deceptive. In these cases, the remedy would
compel a specified statement in a prospective truthful advertisement.
Neither Beneficial nor Egg Nutrition, however, fit into this category of
litigation.
Egg Nutrition is distinguishable from Beneficial in that the regulated
advertisements would be deceptive but for the inclusion of the affirmative
disclosure.225 In Beneficial the court did not order the inclusion of any
specified statement. To the contrary, the appellate court reversed an FTC
order prohibiting Beneficial from using its copyrighted slogan "Instant
Tax Refund" and permitted it to incorporate it into future advertisements
on the condition that they not be misleading.226
The Beneficial decision is questionable in that it appears that the court
overreacted in performing its duty. By failing to accept the opinions of the
FTC and the administrative law judge that the disputed phrase is
"inherently contradictory,, 227 the court, without providing any satisfac-
228 *229tory alternatives, mistakenly overruled the FTC's special expertise.
Certainly, the courts should ensure that federal agencies do not abridge
constitutional freedoms; on the other hand, the FTC, in dealing with
224. 425 U.S. at 771.
225. See generally note 220 supra. The remedy of affirmative disclosure is employed when an
additional disclosure is necessary to prevent an advertisement from being deceptive. See Mann &
Gurol, An Objective Approach to Detecting and Correcting Deceptive Advertising, 54 NoTaH DAMEi
LAW. 73 (1978).
226. 542 F.2d at 618-20.
227. Judge Van Dusen, dissenting on this issue, also supported the FTC's position:
No brief language is equal to the task of explaining the Instant TaK Refund slogan, for the
phrase is inherently contradictory to the truth of Beneficial's offer. In truth, the Instant Tax
Refund is not a refund at all, but only Beneficial's everyday loan service . . . ; nor is it in the
least related to any tax refunds, for the size of the loan Beneficial wishes to sell is geared to the
customer's credit limit instead of his government refund and many people due a government
refund do not qualify for an Instant Tax Refund loan at all ....
Id. at 618 (quoting from the FTC opinion).
228. The court suggested the following alternative slogans: "Beneficial's everyday loan service
can provide to regularly qualified borrowers an Instant Tax Refund Anticipation Loan whether or not
the borrower uses our tax service"; "Beneficial's everyday loan service can provide to any regularly
qualified borrower an instant loan in anticipation of his tax refund. We call it an Instant Tax Refund
Anticipation Loan." Id. at 619. These proposed "alternatives" are far from satisfactory. See Id. at 622
(Van Dusen, J., dissenting). This is especially true in light of the audienceat which Beneficial had aimed
its advertisements-the "singularly dense." Id. at 618.
229. See generally id. at 618 ("We acknowledge, of course, that we are ordinarily obliged to defer
broadly to the Commission's exercise of informed discretion in framing remedial orders . ... ");
Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946); Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F,2d 749,762
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978); Pitofsky, supra note 2; Reich, supra note 100.
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deceptive commercial speech, must be granted a certain degree of
flexibility in formulating its remedial orders.
Egg Nutrition is also a decision of dubious merit. In Virginia
Pharmacy Board, the Supreme Court specifically stated that a state may
"require that a commercial message appear in such a form or include such
additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to
prevent its being deceptive."230 A literal reading of Egg Nutrition would
place in serious jeopardy the required warning upon cigarette packages
and advertisements, which has been cited with approval by the Supreme
231Court on numerous occasions. Moreover, it is doubtful that the
modified decree differs so significantly from the original FTC order that it
justifies application of the least intrusive alternative doctrine.2 32 After all, a
less intrusive alternative "is always available, provided that the govern-
ment is willing to sacrifice effectiveness; but if 'less drastic means' made
that the test, it would simply signal that the right in question had abso-
lute protection. 233 In essence, the test is more properly an indication of a
predetermined conclusion than a rationale justifying the result.234
Neither Egg Nutrition nor Beneficial presents a significant problem
for the free flow of commercial information. Even if the courts had upheld
the remedies imposed by the FTC, those cases would not exert a chilling
effect upon other advertisers. The low vulnerability of commercial speech
permits the judicial review process to grant the FTC a fair amount of
flexibility in formulating its remedial decrees. Mandating that Beneficial
cease further use of its questionable slogan or that NCEN incorporate the
ordered affirmative disclosure into its advertisements did not interfere
seriously, if at all, with their first amendment freedoms. Considering the
important governmental interests in question, one can easily question the
propriety of both decisions. Any impact of the FTC's order upon the
advertisers" first amendment interests is "incidental and minimal."235
Regardless how one ultimately decides these two cases, however, neither
outcome is troublesome; each merely represents an insignificant variation
on a legal theme.
Although even these moderate remedies can be abused, the most
inherently troubling and provocative of the remedies employed to date is
236
corrective advertising. This remedy can easily have an impermissible
chilling effect upon other speech and should be employed only with the
230. 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
231. See, e.g., id.
232. Compare text accompanying notes 208-09 supra with note 220 supra.
233. Note, Less Drastic Means, supra note 64, at 468.
234. Id. at 464. Cf. note 157 supra (noting same weakness in Ohralik decision).
235. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,78 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
236. Corrective advertising has been defined as an order requiring that the advertiser of false or
deceptive claims advise the public of this fact and of the truthful information. See Mann & Gurol,supra
note 225, at 79; Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 694; Thain, Correcth Advertising: Theory and Cases, 19
N.Y.L.F. 1, 11 (1973).
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greatest of restraint. The only court of appeals decision to have approved
this drastic form of relief is the District of Columbia Circuit in Warner-
Lambert Co. v. FTC.
217
In Warner-Lambert, the FTC challenged the company's nearly one
hundred-year-old representation 238 "that Listerine will ameliorate, pre-
vent, and cure colds and sore throats., 23 9 In upholding the FTC's com-
plaint and its utilization of the corrective advertising remedy (although
modifying slightly this part of the decree),240 the court was swayed by
the long history of Warner-Lambert's deceptive trade practice, 24' by the
success of the advertising campaign to create such a false image in the
public's mind,242 and by the fact that this false perception would con-
tinue if not corrected. 243 Therefore, the court held Ihat Warner-Lambert
must (1) cease and desist from representing that Listerine is effec-
tive in curing or preventing colds or sore throats, (2) cease and desist
from representing that Listerine will successfully ameliorate the severity of
colds or sore throats, and (3) cease and desist advertising Listerine, unless
the next ten million dollars of advertisements includes the following
disclaimer--"Listerine will not help prevent colds or sore throats or lessen
their severity., 244 This mandatory disclosure statement was modified by
the court by deleting the preamble-"contrary to prior advertising' 45-
that the FTC had imposed.
Although the first amendment demands that the corrective adver-
tising remedy be judiciously employed, 246 it is clear 'that such a remedy is
essential to the efficient functioning of the FTC.247 Thus, a delicate balance
237. 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978). In numerous previous
instances the FTC has approved the utilization of the corrective advertising remedy. Id. at 759-61.
238. Listerine has been marketed as a medicine for colds since 1579. Direct advertising to tile
consumer began in 1921. Id. at 752.
239. Id. at 753.
240. See text accompanying note 245 infra.
241. 562 F.2d at 760-61.
242. Id. at 762.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 753.
245. Id. at 762-63.
246. Judge Wright, writing for the court, properly held that the first amendment does not present
an obstacle to the use of corrective advertising when necessary to prevent its being deceptive or
misleading. It was his contention that the Supreme Court foresaw this very problem and answered it in
favor of allowing such relief in footnote 24 of Virginia Pharmacy Board. 562 F.2d at 758-59, 768-69.
247. Judge Wright referred to Professor Pitofsky's article in concluding that corrective
advertising relief is essential to the effective working of the FTC. It is Professor Pitofsky's position that:
Faced with these pathetically inadequate remedies [of the FTC--cease and desist orders
and affirmative disclosure], many advertisers and advertising agencies violated the law with
impunity. Rational advertisers could calculate that their chances of being detected and
prosecuted were extremely slim, given the limited resources of the Federal Trade
Commission . . . . Moreover, since most advertising themes are designed to run for a year
or less, and since the average time for investigation and trial ... extend[s) well over two
years ... [there is an] absence of effective government remedies ....
Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 693 (footnotes omitted). See also Mann & Gurol, supra note225, at 78; Note,
Corrective Advertising Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 85 HARV. L. REV. 477,482-84 (197 1).
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must be sustained in order to properly accommodate these essential
interests.
If corrective advertising relief is granted too perfunctorily, it will tend
to cause advertisers to refrain from making statements in fear of having to
expend huge sums on corrective advertisements24 and undercutting their
own future advertising campaigns.249 It would particularly chill the
presentation of scientific and experimental data that are informative to the
consumer, favoring mere puffery and nonsense commercials. It is
commonly understood that the results of bona fide scientific experiments
may subsequently prove to be incorrect. If an advertiser is forced to confess
at great expense that its earlier good faith experimental result-Y shaving
cream lasts twenty-eight percent longer-was incorrect-it actually lasts
only six percent longer-the advertiser will be more inclined to forego
providing the consumer with such seemingly relevant data.
This is not to suggest that corrective advertising and an effective FTC
do not merit support. It suggests only that the formulation of Warner-
Lambert and the formulations of commentators such as Professor
Pitofsky concerning the appropriate use of corrective advertising are
unduly lax. The Warner-Lambert formula would authorize corrective
advertising if (1) the advertisement played a significant role in creating a
false image in the public's mind, and (2) this false belief would continue
even after cessation of the deceptive advertisements. 250 To this the author
suggests that a requirement of bad faith, reckless indifference, or other
compelling reason for the corrective advertising must also be added. Such
a restriction would pay appropriate deference to the first amendment, yet
allow the FTC to employ its most powerful sanction to correct egregious
abuses.
It is unclear whether this added proviso would alter the Warner-
Lambert decision; first, the court had no need to resolve the issue of
Warner-Lambert's good faith in the presentation of the advertisements, 25'
and second, there is insufficient information to determine whether there
exists any additional compelling reason for requiring the corrective
248. In Warner-Lambert the company was ordered to include the corrective statement in
"only . . . the next ten million dollars of Listerine advertising,' the equivalent of the company's
average yearly advertisement expenditure on Listerine. 562 F.2d at 753.
249. Clearly, the effectiveness of the Listerine commercials is being compromised by the forced
inclusion of the corrective statement. It is interesting to note how the court justified the remedy of
forcing even truthful future advertisements to contain the corrective statement. Judge Wright deftly
stated that the future advertisement, "ifnot accompanied by a corrective message, would itselfcontinue
to mislead the public." Id. at 770.
250. Professor Pitofsky's formulation differs from, orclarifies, this formulation by(l) providing
that the principle only applies to major advertising themes and then only when the deceit significantly
affects the purchasing decision of a substantial number of consumers, and (2) placing upon the
defendant the burden of demonstrating the lack ofcausality. Pitofsky, supra note2, at 698-99. Seralso
Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978)
(supplemental opinion). See generally 42 Fed. Reg. 12,924 (1977) (soliciting comments on proposed
interpretive rule or policy statement on corrective advertising).
251. The court did state that Warner-Lambert worked a "substantial deception upon the
public." 562 F.2d at 769.
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message-for instance, the fact that the improper representation had been
made for nearly a century. With regard to the latter point, however, one
should not ignore the FTC's own lack of diligence in allowing this
representation to continue for such a prolonged period.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have eliminated the
doctrine that commercial speech is wholly outside the protection of the
first amendment (in other words, that it is really "nonspeech"), and in its
place have established the principle that speech that does no more than
propose a commercial transaction is entitled to a "lesser degree" of
constitutional protection. This limited grant of shelter is warranted due to
the advertiser's, consumer's, and general public's interest in the
communication. Such messages provide important information for the
proper and efficient allocation of resources in our free market system. At
the same time, commercial communication is less valuable and less
vulnerable than other varieties of speech and 'hence does not merit
complete first amendment protection.
Although this modified doctrine is well-suited to commercial speech,
its appropriateness for other areas is highly questionable. Unless a
category of speech satisfies both criteria of the doctrine (less valuable and
less vulnerable) such expansion is totally unjustified. Moreover, the
doctrine should not be applied to areas of speech that are already
"protected"; it should only be used to grant limited rights to previously
unprotected areas of speech.
Finally, the courts, in applying this new doctrine, must consider and
delicately balance the competing interests. They must recognize the
legitimate right of the FTC to regulate deceptive advertisements and
provide the agency with a suitable degree of latitude; at the same time, they
must not ignore their fundamental constitutional obligation to protect first
amendment rights. It is inevitable that this new, intermediate doctrine will
be criticized from both sides; the burden has now shifted to the critics to
present a more satisfactory and practical solution to the commercial
speech quandary. Contemplating the multitude of considerations to be
weighed, this author takes the position that the critics will be unable to
derive a formula superior to the one established by the Supreme Court and
presented in this article.
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